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Recently, Stephen Maitzen has provided an argument for the nonexistence of God based on ordinary morality. Here is Maitzen's argument, abbreviated down to the relevant parts for my reply and slightly reformulated for ease of presentation:
(1) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary, human suffering only if such suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer. (Maitzen calls this "TI") (2) If God exists, then necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer.
(From 1) (3) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer, then we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suff ering. (4) We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suff ering. (5) So, it isn't the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the sufferer. (From 3 and 4) (6) So: God does not exist. (From 2 and 5) I will assume the truth of (1), and thus of (2) which follows from (1). My problem is with (3). Maitzen must do much more to show that (3) is true, or even very plausible. My argument is that (a) the set of propositions I am about to list is not implausible, granting God's existence and perfect goodness and a proper understanding of ordinary morality, and (b) since that is so, the consequent of (3) does not plausibly follow from (3)'s antecedent.
Let P be any person that I allow to endure suff ering, instead of preventing the suff ering. And let S be the particular instance of suff ering that P undergoes. And consider the following set of fi ve propositions, the fi rst four of which are about God and the fi ft h a moral principle: (G1) God has so created the world that God is able to produce for P a degree, D, of good for P that will make P's existence worthwhile. (G2) God will bring about D for P. Th is will not be in the form of compensation but a result produced by P's history. (G3) D is a maximal degree of good that God can produce for P. (G4) God will bring about D for P whether P suff ers (this particular) S or not. If P suff ers S, then God will produce a net good from S for P, to off set the evil of S in order to reach D. (G5) One can morally allow P to suff er S, if and only if the net benefi t to P from allowing S will far outweigh S, and either: (a) the net benefi t to P from allowing S will be far greater than the good that will be P's if one prevents S, or (b) the net benefi t to P from one's allowing S will not be less than the good that will be P's if one prevents S, and allowing S will signifi cantly increase the net good in the world.
I now explain each of the members of (G1)-(G5): (G1) and (G2) are consequences of theodical individualism, according to which God must see to it that each person's life be worthwhile, and not just that the existence of the world at large be worthwhile. I include in P's existence P's life aft er death. I envision the degree of good that is P's in the aft erlife as produced by earlier events and not as compensation. I also do not disallow a view like John Hick's wherein we continue to grow and change in the aft erlife with new degrees of goodness accruing to our existence.
(G3) follows from God's supreme goodness. Th ere will be constraints upon what the maximal degree of goodness is that God can produce for P. For example, God will want the best distribution of good overall in the world and will want a world that is good overall. So, given such con-straints, God will produce the best possible degree of good for P. P will have no claims against God that God did not produce a higher degree of good for her, because her existence is the best it could be without fulfi lling her selfi sh desires to get more for herself on other peoples' accounts.
(G4) refl ects the fact that God is so damned smart that God has been able to create the world so that whether P suff ers S or not, P will receive D. And it refl ects God's goodness, in that God would not allow S to occur if it were to detract from the ultimate net result, D, for P.
(G5) makes a claim about our ordinary morality. It says that while consequentialist reckoning is relevant to the allowing of undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering, the morality of allowing such suff ering is not purely consequentialist. Th at is because we have a moral deontological obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering (when able, when appropriately situated, etc.). And while that obligation is defeasible, it is not overridden by a mere net benefi t for the suff erer.
What is needed to defeat the deontological obligation not to allow suff ering is that either: (a) the net benefi t far outweighs the suff ering and far outweighs what good would accrue to the suff erer without that suffering; or (b) the net benefi t that far outweighs the suff ering is at least the same as what good would accrue to the suff erer without that suff ering, and produces a signifi cant net increase of good in the world. Th ese are necessary and suffi cient conditions for one being allowed not to prevent undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering.
On alternative (a), the benefi t justifying one's not preventing the suffering is all P's. On alternative (b), however, the benefi t that justifi es not preventing the suff ering is not P's but others' . Th is can happen in at least two ways. Th e fi rst is that one might be able to bring a very high benefi t to another person by allowing P to suff er. And the second is that in adjudicating one's moral obligations to others as well as to P it turns out that one's obligations to others are stronger than, and so defeat, one's obligation to prevent P from enduring S.
You might protest that (b) violates Maitzen's Kantian stricture, let's call it "K. " (K) Nobody (including God) can treat human beings merely as a means.
Th e violation appears to occur because (G5) permits us (and God) to allow P to suff er in order to benefi t others.
However, (G5) does not violate (K), on Maitzen's interpretation of it, which I accept. For Maitzen, (K) prohibits "sacrifi cing an innocent person who did not ask for it" (p. 116, my emphasis), and (K) prohibits, "exploiting" a person by visiting upon them undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering (p. 117). However, (G5) licenses none of these. Remember, whenever (G5) allows the non-prevention of undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering the suff erer is either better off or at least as well off as she would have been without having endured that suff ering. Th e only thing that has happened is that the deontological moral obligation that others have not to allow P to endure undeserved, involuntary, suff ering has been overridden by either a justifi ed benefi t to P or to others. Th is does not constitute a "sacrifi ce" or "exploitation" of P in any way, and should not be forbidden by (K). To put it tersely, (G5) does not excuse any instance in which a person treats P merely as a means.
It is not implausible to assume that the set (G1)-(G5) is true, granting God's existence and perfect goodness and our understanding of ordinary morality. But, then the antecedent of (3): (3a) Necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer.
does not plausibly imply (3)'s consequent:
(3c) We never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suff ering.
Th at my allowing P's undeserved, involuntary suff ering will result in a net benefi t for P is, by (G5), not suffi cient reason for me to not have a moral obligation to prevent P's suff ering. More is necessary. So, (3) is not plausible. Even if all involuntary human suff ering ultimately were to produce a net benefi t for the suff erer, there would still be instances in which I had a moral obligation to prevent it. Such would be an instance, for example, where the benefi t to the suff erer is only slightly more than preventing the suff ering would yield. Moreover, according to (G1)-(G4), it will never be the case that we may allow an instance of undeserved, involuntary suff ering on the grounds that it will produce a far greater benefi t for the person than would preventing the suff ering. And that is because in every instance, according to (G1)-(G4), God will in any case bring about the maximum possible degree of good for the person during his existence -whether he endures that particular suff ering or not. So the clause (a) of (G5) will never apply to any of us when faced with the opportunity to prevent suff ering. For my money, theodical individualism should entail that we always have an obligation to prevent a case of suff ering in P, unless the conditions of (G5) are met. In practice, this means that in the great majority of situations, my theodical individualism will obligate preventing suff ering. In any case, since (G1)- (G5) is not implausible, (3) is not yet plausible.
Well, now, you ask, what justifi es God allowing undeserved, involuntary suff ering? Aft er all, (G5) obligates God no less than it does mere mortals. And since God is a perfect being God will faithfully fulfi ll the dictate of (G5).
On (G1)-(G4), it follows that the suff ering God allows a person to endure is such that God allows it either: (i) so as to produce for that person a degree of good that is maximal for that person and also satisfi es the conditions of (G5), or: (ii) because allowing it follows from God's juggling of God's obligations to all human persons. Since God is the creator of all persons and sustains them in life at every moment, all human beings stand before God with an equal claim on God to produce for them a maximal possible ultimate benefi t in their existence. All human beings are turned to God with an equal claim to a personal maximal net benefi t, everything else being equal. Th us, God's obligations to others besides P are of vastly greater dimensions than that of any human being to other persons. Th at is at least one reason why God might be justifi ed in allowing suff ering in the world, in vastly many cases, while humans have relatively sparse permission to do so. I have already argued that in light of (G1)-(G5) such thinking does not violate the above Kantian stricture about using people as mere means.
One might be skeptical as to whether the world we live in is one where the God of (G1)-(G4) exists. One might doubt, for example, whether every person receives an ultimate benefi t that makes his or her existence worthwhile. Such doubts belong to the problem of evil and must be discussed on their own. Th ey do not relate to the present argument against God's existence from theodical individualism. Th at argument, I have tried to show, fails to convince.
